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MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF EMU AT 







With no doubt, the main cost of joining a currency area is the loss of monetary policy instruments at a 
national level (e.g. the exchange rate) as stabilisation mechanisms against macroeconomic disturbances that 
only affect one country of the area or affect them in different manners. As this kind of macroeconomic 
disturbances, known as “asymmetric shocks”, cannot be dealt by a common monetary policy, alternative 
adjustment mechanisms are needed to achieve macroeconomic stabilisation. However, the evidence for 
Europe has shown that European countries have a lower response capacity than other currency areas. 
 
For this reason, several studies have examined to what extent asymmetric shocks have been relevant in 
Europe in the past, mainly at a national level. However, the regional dimension is relevant for this 
analysis. Not all the regions are equally affected by the problem of asymmetric shocks. The consideration 
of the fact that European regions did not have sovereignty to apply their own autonomous policy implies 
that, inside every national state, there could have been regions adversely affected by the national single 
monetary policy in presence of asymmetric shocks. In this sense, the consideration of the effects of taking 
part in the Economic and Monetary Union necessarily involves to consider the relative situation of every 
region inside their own country. If the relationships between every region and the European aggregates 
are as intense as the relationships with the previous national aggregate, the relative position of the region 
in this new macroeconomic framework will be similar to the previous one. In this paper, we analyse 
macroeconomic effects of EMU at a regional level using the Eurostat Regio database. The results show 
that there are big differences among regions: there will be winners and losers.  
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Most economic analysis of Monetary Integration processes take as a starting point the 
Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. This theory has its origins in the work of Mundell 
(1961), followed by McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). These works were placed in 
the intense debate during the sixties and mid-seventies about fixed versus flexible 
exchange rates. Their objective was to identify the criteria that determine whether a 
country should join a currency area or not. The strategy consisted in identifying the 
main benefits and costs that an individual country would experience joining a currency 
area. If for every participant, benefits overweight costs, then the currency area is said to 
be optimal. 
 
The intensification of the European Monetary Integration process has brought up to date 
the main ideas of these contributions to analyse the potential benefits and risks of the 
Economic and Monetary Union. In this sense, while there exists a certain consensus on 
EMU positive economic effects -specially at a microeconomic level (De Grauwe, 
1997)- which can be summarised as direct and indirect benefits of transaction costs 
reduction, less uncertainty and more transparency in price determination mechanisms, 
there is no agreement on potential costs. The main potential cost of joining a currency 
area is the loss of monetary policy instruments at a national level (e.g. the exchange 
rate) as stabilisation mechanisms against macroeconomic disturbances that only affect 
one country of the area or affect them in different manners. As this kind of 
macroeconomic disturbances, known as “asymmetric shocks”, cannot be dealt by a 
common monetary policy, alternative adjustment mechanisms are needed to achieve 
macroeconomic stabilisation. In this sense, there is an agreement that European 
countries have a lower response capacity in front of adverse asymmetric shocks than 
other currency areas using alternative adjustment mechanisms such as factor mobility 
(Kenen, 1989; Eichengreen, 1992; Begg, 1995), fiscal redistribution (Boadway and 
Flatters, 1982; Sachs and Sala-i-Martí, 1991; Bayoumi and Masson, 1995) and 
flexibility of wages and prices (Layard et al., 1991; Heylen et al., 1995; Viñals and  
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Jimeno, 1996). If alternative adjustment mechanisms are limited, the only chance of 
success is that asymmetric shocks tend to be small or even disappear. 
 
For this reason, several studies have examined to what extent asymmetric shocks have 
been relevant in Europe in the past, mainly at a national level. However, the regional 
dimension is relevant for this analysis. Not all the regions are equally affected by the 
problem of asymmetric shocks. The consideration of the fact that European regions did 
not have sovereignty to apply their own autonomous policy implies that, inside every 
national state, there could have been regions adversely affected by the national single 
monetary policy in presence of asymmetric shocks. In this sense, the consideration of 
the effects of taking part in the Economic and Monetary Union necessarily involves to 
consider the relative situation of every region inside their own country. If the 
relationships between every region and the European aggregates are as intense as the 
relationships with the previous national aggregate, the relative position of the region in 
this new macroeconomic framework will be similar to the previous one. 
 
For this reason, the objective of this paper consists in analysing the macroeconomic 
effects of EMU at a regional level. The paper is organized as follows: first, previous 
works assessing the role of asymmetric shocks are briefly summarised; second, the 
applied methodology, the available statistical information and the obtained empirical 
evidence are described; and, last, the paper ends summarising the main conclusions and 
the future lines of research. 
 
2. Assessing the role of asymmetric shocks: A brief summary of previous works 
 
In this section, previous results by other authors focusing in the empirical relevance of 
asymmetric shocks for European countries and regions are briefly summarised. First, 
results of the works that have considered this question at the national level are 
summarised and next previous results at the regional level are presented. 
 
2.1. Evidence at a national level 
 
In the literature studying the asymmetry of shocks, early contributions examined the 
correlation coefficients for output movements across countries and argued that countries  
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whose GDP tended to move together experienced relatively symmetrical disturbances. 
Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) were the first to evaluate empirically the nature of shocks 
experienced by France and Germany using quarterly data of output, prices and current 
account deficit for the period 1965/I-1987/IV. The results obtained from this 
comparison show that shocks experienced by France and Germany during this period 
were mainly symmetric. 
 
From this work, other authors extended similar analysis to wider sets of countries and 
longest time periods. But the most influential work in this line of research was Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1992). These authors applied the methodology proposed by Blanchard 
and Quah (1989) as a way to distinguish between demand and supply shocks. The 
distinction between demand and supply shocks permits to relate the degree of symmetry 
among two economies to the factors causing the shocks. To evaluate the degree of 
symmetry between countries, they calculate the correlation coefficients among the 
series of shocks. If the values of these coefficients are high, it would be expected that 
the countries under study have experienced relatively symmetrical disturbances. Using 
data for the period 1960-1988 for the 12 countries belonging to the European Union 
(EU) in that moment, they find a clear distinction between core and pheripherical 
countries. The values of the correlation coefficients between European countries were 
also clearly lower than those among the American States. From their analysis, it seems 
that a monetary union involving all EU member countries will be a bad idea. 
 
However, in a more recent work, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) replicated the 
previous analysis using more recent data (1960-1993). Two facts should be highlighted 
from their results: first, the German reunification seems to have altered substantially the 
macroeconomic relationships between Germany and the other European countries; and 
second, the distinction between core and peripherical countries is not so clear. Shocks 
experienced by European countries have been more symmetric in recent years.  
 
These optimistic results have been also confirmed by other works such as Artis and 
Zhang (1996, 1997) who also find evidence of positive and significant correlation 
between the cyclical component of European economies. Both authors point out the role 
of the European Monetary System as a possible explanatory factor of this higher 
cyclical synchronity during the most recent years.  
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Rubin and Thygesen (1996) also find evidence of this higher cyclical synchronity using 
industrial output data for the period 1983-1994 for nine European countries (Germany, 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom). Their 
results are relevant because they show that the symmetry for the manufacturing sector is 
higher than for the whole economy. 
 
Ramos et al. (1999) also offer empirical evidence about the relative size and the degree 
of symmetry of shocks between European countries using manufacturing data from 
1975 to 1996. Their results, applying time varying coefficient models to take into 
account the dinamicity of the process of European Integration, show that demand and 
supply shocks, but specially the first, have been more symmetric during the most recent 
years. 
 
Summarising, previous works that have analysed the degree of symmetry between 
European countries at a national level show that there has been a reduction of 
asymmetric shocks during the most recent years and also that asymmetric shocks are 
more important for the whole economy than for the manufacturing sector. 
 
2.2. Evidence at a regional level 
 
The consideration of the regional dimension introduces two additional factors in the 
analysis of the relevance of asymmetric shocks for European countries and regions. 
First, the analysis of asymmetric shocks at a regional level is related with the degree of 
concentration of economic activity. And, second, it is important to take into account 
that, before the adoption of the single currency, European regions were part of other 
currency unions: the national states and, regions did not have sovereignty to apply their 
own autonomous monetary policy. For this reason, to analyse the regional effects of 
EMU, it will be necessary to compare the previous situation with the existing one. 
 
In relation to the first factor, the relationship between asymmetric shocks and the degree 
of concentration, this idea was first introduced by Kenen (1969). He noted that when a 
region (or a country) has a sectorally-diversified productive structure, it tends to 
experience less asymmetric shocks. The idea, then, is that if economic activity is very  
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specialised at the regional level, it will experience more asymmetric shocks. So, if as a 
consequence of EMU, regions become more specialised, asymmetric shocks would 
increase. 
 
According to Krugman, the interaction of increasing returns, transportation costs and 
demand is the main driving force behind geographic concentration of production. 
Following this literature, known as economic geography or “new trade” theories, the 
complete removal of barriers to trade and the improvement of the functioning of the 
Single Market as a result of EMU, will lead to regional concentration of industrial 
activity. The basic argument is that when barriers to trade decline, two opposite forces 
appear: agglomeration forces, which in the presence of scale economies will tend to 
concentrate production in a single location with large local demand (core), and 
disagglomeration forces, which due to the improved access to peripherical markets will 
permit these countries to gain locational attractiveness. The graphical illustration of the 
two forces is the well known U-shaped curve that relates the level of integration and the 
relative wage of the periphery (Krugman and Venables, 1990). The fact that trade may 
lead to regional concentration (agglomeration forces prevail) has been illustrated by 
comparing the regional distribution of production in the United States and Europe. 
Production in the United States is more regionally concentrated than in the EU’s 
countries and, following Krugman (1991), the reason is that the US market is more 
highly integrated than EU’s. This evidence suggests that European countries will expect 
similar levels of regional concentration in a near future, and as a result, more 
asymmetric shocks at the regional level. 
 
However, a different, most optimistic view, has been defended by the European 
Commission in the report “One Money, One Market” (1990). This study predicts that 
asymmetric shocks in the future will decrease as a consequence of the increase in intra-
industry trade, and, if this kind of trade predominates, productive structures will be 
more similar. As De Grauwe (1997) remarks, trade based on scale economies and 
product differentiation would lead to a situation where most demand shocks will affect 
participating countries in a similar way. So, demand shocks will tend to be more 
symmetric. If this view is correct, the loss of national sovereignty over the exchange 
rate will have no repercussion in terms of macroeconomic adjustment capacity. 
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Empirical works analysing this question have not arrived to conclusive results. Using 
regional data for EU15 for employment in 17 branches (including services) for the 
period 1950-1990, Molle (1996) finds a general trend for less concentration and less 
specialisation of EU regions and Brülhart (1997) shows that manufacturing had a lower 
centrality in the 1980s than in the 1970s. However, Hallet (2000) using regional data for 
a most recent period shows that the specialisation index has an increasingly similar 
pattern for most regions which reflects the general structural change from 
manufacturing into services. The analysis of concentration also shows a high degree of 
stability during time. Both results are “rather good news in that it reduces the 
probability of region-specific shocks and does not confirm the expectations of increased 
probability following European integration” (Hallet, 2000, p. 14).  
 
In relation to the second aspect, the consideration of the fact that European regions did 
not have sovereignty to apply their own autonomous policy implies that inside every 
national state there could have been regions adversely affected by the national single 
monetary policy in presence of asymmetric shocks. In this sense, the consideration of 
the effects of taking part in the Economic and Monetary Union necessarily involves to 
consider the relative situation of every region inside their own country. 
 
However, previous studies using regional data such as Abraham (1996), De Nardis et al. 
(1996), Forni and Reichlin (1997) or Funke et al. (1999) have not explicitely considered 
this question. Only De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1991) and Funke (1997) have taken 
into account the previous line of reasoning. On one hand, the results obtained by the 
first authors show that the long run divergences in national growth rates are 
substantially lower than the long run divergences in regional growth rates. Thus, regions 
belonging to the same countries in Europe tend to have a more unequal development of 
their output than nations. From these results, one could think that the move towards 
EMU will not change the adverse relative position of some regions. On the other hand, 
the results obtained by Funke (1997) shows that the correlations of shocks between 16 
European countries are much lower than the correlations within West German Landers. 
His results also show that there are big differences between these regions: while regions 
such as North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, Saarland and Rhineland-Palant have very high 
correlations, other regions such as Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria have medium 
values and other such as Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg have values close to zero.  
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These results mean that a German national monetary policy would be appropriated for 
the first and second set of regions but not for the third as, in general, shocks among 
these regions are not completely symmetric. In the next section, this fact will be taken 
into account for the case of a more detailed data set for European regions. 
 
 




The methodology used in this section consists in comparing the value of the correlation 
coefficients between the growth rate of the same variable for three different territories: 
the considered region, its respective country and Europe. Two different definitions of 
European aggregates are considered in the paper: the Economic and Monetary Union 
aggregate (11 countries) and the aggregate for the 15 countries that nowadays belong to 
the European Union. The consideration of both aggregates permits to assess the effects 
of the possible incorporation of Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom to the 
Eurozone for every considered region. 
 
As it has been previously exposed, the comparison of these values permits to assess the 
disadvantages (the macroeconomic cost) for every region of taking part in the Economic 
and Monetary Union. If the relationships between every region and Europe are as 
intense as the relationships between the region and its respective country, the relative 
position of the region in this new macroeconomic framework will be similar to the 
previous one. There will be no additional macroeconomic cost.  
 
However, one disadvantage of the comparison of the values of the correlation 
coefficients is that in small samples there exists the danger of accepting as true, false 
correlations. For this reason, we have applied the criterium to distinguish between 
significant and not significant correlations proposed by Brandner and Neuser (1992). 
These authors suggest to take as the critical values for detrended series (as the ones 
considered in this paper) at a 5% significance level, the values obtained from the 
expression  n / 2 , where n is the number of observations of the considered series. The 
values of this test for the different considered time periods can be found in table 1.  
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The rest of the section is organised as follows: first, the considered variables and the 
statistical sources used in the paper are clearly described and second, the obtained 
results at a national and at a regional level are shown. 
 
3.2. Definition of the considered variables and description of the available statistical 
information 
 
To assess the degree of symmetry of shocks experienced by European regions and 
countries, the analysis will focused on the evolution of gross domestic product and 
prices. The reason to choose these two variables instead of other macroeconomic 
variables is that the objectives of the monetary policy are closely related to them. 
 
In this sense, we will analyse the relationships among the growth rates of the gross 
domestic product at market prices in terms of the population of every considered 
territory (i.e. the growth rates of the GDP per capita). Information at the European and 
national levels have been obtained from Eurostat “National Accounts” and “Main 
Demographic indicators” (as collected in electronic format in the International 
Statistical Yearbook ed. 2000). Data are available from 1961 to 1998.  
 
Data at the regional level have been taken from Eurostat’s REGIO database which is the 
only source providing comparable EU-wide regional data based on a standardised 
classification of regions (“NUTS”). Considering the NUTS II classification level, we 
have obtained information for GDP and population for the period 1982-1996 for most 
regions. In particular and due to data restrictions, we have included in the analysis the 
eleven “provinces” of Belgium; thirty of the forty “regierungsbezirke” of Germany 
(East Germany regions have been excluded); the Spanish seventeen “comunidades 
autónomas” (Ceuta and Melilla have been excluded); the twenty-two “régions” of 
France; the Italian twenty “regioni”; the twelve Dutch “provincies” and the five 
“comissaoes de coerdenaçao regional” and the two “regioes autonomas” of Portugal. 
Austria and Finland have not been included in the analysis as statistical information for 
these variables was very scarce. Uniregional countries in the Euro zone such as 
Luxembourg and Ireland (with only 2 regions)  at the NUTSII level have not been  
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included in the analysis. Greece has not been considered as when we started the paper, it 
did not take part in the euro zone. 
 
In respect to prices, information at the European and national levels have been obtained 
from the same sources. At the regional level, however no information of prices 
evolution is available. For these reasons, we have calculated the growth rate of the ratio 
“compensation of employees” / “number of employees” for every region using 
information from the Eurostat “regio”. We have also calculated this ratio at the 
European and National level. Although one can think this variable can provide a good 
aproximation to prices evolution, data restrictions only made possible to calculate this 
ratio for the Dutch, Italian and Spanish regions and for the period 1980-1995. 
 
3.3 Empirical evidence 
 
In this section, the results of applying the proposed methodology using the statistical 
data described in the previous section are presented.  
 
However, and before commenting the results at a regional level, we have also analised 
the relationships between European countries at a national level for the period 1962-
1998 and for the three considered variables: GPD, prices and wages. The values of the 
correlation coefficients among the growth rates of the national variables and of 
European aggregates are shown in table 2. From the results in this table, we can 
conclude that: 
 
• The values of the correlation coefficients are very high for the three considered 
variables for every country. Only the correlation coefficient among wages 
growth rates for Greece and for the European Union is not significant using the 
Brandner and Neuser (1992) test. In fact, the evolution of wages is the less 
similar among countries of the three considered variables.  
 
• However, and although correlations are significant and high, there are important 
differences among countries in the line of those found by previous authors: there 
is evidence of a core-periphery pattern. 
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• The differences in terms of correlations between a currency area including only 
the Euro Zone countries or the fifteen countries of the European Union are 
scarce. In fact, only one country would be better in a wide currency area: the 
United Kingdom. 
 
• It is also important to remark that the relationships between countries in terms of 
prices are very similar to the relationships in terms of wages. This result is 
relevant as, when looking at regions, no information of prices is available and, 
so, prices evolution will be approximated by wages evolution. 
 
In tables 3 to 9, the results for the different regions of every considered country are 
shown. In these tables, the values of the correlation coefficients among the growth rates 
of GDP and wages (when possible) of the considered regions and its respective country 
are shown first and next, the evolution of every region is compared with the evolution of 
the two considered European aggregates: the Euro Zone and the European Union. From 
these tables, we can conclude that: 
 
• There are regional differences inside every considered country. 
 
• There are also differences in terms of the relevance of these differences. For 
example, and in terms of GDP, the average value of the regional correlation 
coefficient with the country aggregates is near 0.9 for France and Italy; it is near 
0.7 for Spain and Belgium and for Germany, Netherlands and Portugal it is 0.6. 
 
• However, it is important to remark that the average correlations with the 
respective country is always higher than average correlations with the European 
agreggates, but correlations with EMU aggregates are usually higher than 
correlations with the EU aggergates. In general terms, the standard deviation of 
the correlation coefficients also increases when considering the European 
aggregates. 
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• In general, most regions keep the same relative status inside their own country 
when comparing the previous situation with the actual one, but others experience 
important changes: 
 
o Regions with low correlations with their respective country will have 
still lower correlations with European aggregates (for example, some 
Italian regions such as Basilicata or Calabria or some portuguese regions 
such as Norte, Centro or Lisboa e Vale do Tejo) but there are a few 
exceptions (for example, in the Netherlands: Flevoland, Utrecht and 
Zeeland). 
 
o There are also regions with high correlations with their respective 
countries that show quite low values when related with European 
aggregates. For example, the Spanish regions of Andalucía, Navarra and 
País Vasco, the French region of Bretagne, in Netherlands, the regions of 
Drenthe and Noord-Holland and the region of Algarve in Portugal. 
 
o There are some regions that show a significant correlation (following 
Brandner and Neuser criteria) with its own country, but they do not show 
this significant correlation with the European aggregates (see table 10). 
This means that these regions will be potential losers in the integration 
process. There are also some regions that have an important correlation 
with their respective country and have increased it with the aggregates 
(see table 11). 
 
Summarising, the results show that national monetary policies in the European countries 
were not appropriated for every of the regions belonging to the country. In this sense, 
the adoption of the single currency and a common monetary policy will change the 
relative situation of these regions. These changes will not be equal for every region: 
there will be winners and losers and it is important that these changes are taken into 
account. 
  




In this paper, we have considered the macroeconomic effects of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) at a regional level. 
 
The methodological approach, based in the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, has 
consisted in comparing the values of the correlation coefficients for different economic 
variables among every region, country and euro aggregates. The obtained results show 
that macroeconomic costs for every region of taking part into EMU will be different: 
there will be winners and losers. 
 
However, it is important to remark that these conclusions should be taken with care for 
two reasons: First, as Wyplosz (1997) remarks, studies based on the Theory of 
Optimum Currency Areas are not able to consider all the effects of the European 
monetary integration process. In this sense, Krugman (1992) also affirms that the 
analysis of Optimum Currency Areas is far from giving an operative guide to take 
political decisions, but at least, it permits to be conscious of what we know and what we 
do not know. Second, a most important criticism is the applicability of the Lucas (1976) 
critique. Are the inferences based on historical data valid? Without doubt, the EMU 
implies a new economic framework for European economies. In fact, it will surely 
represent a structural break, a change that we cannot predict. So, although the results of 
the work are optimistic or pessimistic depending on the considered region, the attitude 
of citizens, firms and public institutions towards the euro will be determinant to take 
profit of the advantages derived of the single currency. 
 
Further research will focus on two aspects: the consequences of these regional 
differences for the sustainability of EMU and the identification of the causes of this 
situation. 
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7. Figures and tables 
 
Table 1 
Critical values of the Brandner and Neuser (1992) test for 
the different considered time periods 
Time period  Observations  n / 2  
1962-1998  37  0.33 
1982-1996  15  0.52 
1981-1995  15  0.52 
1983-1996  14  0.53 
1987-1996  10  0.63 
1987-1995  9  0.67 
1989-1996  8  0.71 
 
Table 2 
Correlation coefficients among growth rates 
GDP/POP  PRICES  WAGES 
1962-1998 
EMU  EU  EMU  EU  EMU  EU 
EMU    0.99    0.99    0.98 
Austria  0.92  0.92  0.86  0.85  0.84  0.81 
Belgium  0.94  0.93  0.88  0.88  0.87  0.87 
Denmark  0.75  0.76  0.87  0.85  0.82  0.80 
Finland  0.71  0.72  0.87  0.88  0.79  0.84 
France  0.98  0.97  0.96  0.95  0.94  0.94 
Germany  0.87  0.88  0.75  0.74  0.70  0.62 
Greece  0.65  0.67  0.57  0.59  0.33  0.41 
Ireland  0.55  0.54  0.91  0.91  0.85  0.90 
Italy  0.94  0.93  0.97  0.96  0.89  0.89 
Luxemburg  0.53  0.52  0.89  0.89  0.79  0.80 
Netherland  0.92  0.92  0.71  0.71  0.74  0.68 
Portugal  0.72  0.71  0.78  0.78  0.65  0.74 
Spain  0.83  0.82  0.90  0.90  0.88  0.85 
Sweden  0.87  0.88  0.83  0.85  0.69  0.74 
United Kingdom  0.80  0.86  0.86  0.91  0.75  0.86 
Average  0.80  0.80  0.84  0.84  0.78  0.77 
Std. deviation  0.14  0.14  0.10  0.10  0.13  0.14 
   Correlations in italics are not significant according to critical values of the 
   Brandner and Neuser (1992) test.  
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Table 3 
Correlation coefficients among growth rates of GDP/POP 
1982-1996  Belgium  EMU  EU 
Belgium    0.84  0.83 
Région Bruxelles-capitale  0.77  0.54  0.55 
Antwerpen  0.91  0.68  0.74 
Limburg  0.42  0.09  0.44 
Oost-Vlaanderen  0.90  0.80  0.92 
Vlaams Brabant  0.76  0.68  0.44 
West-Vlaanderen  0.91  0.80  0.80 
Brabant Wallon  0.60  0.70  0.36 
Hainaut  0.79  0.70  0.69 
Liège  0.84  0.90  0.70 
Luxembourg (B)  0.88  0.77  0.64 
Namur  0.35  0.21  0.17 
Average  0.74  0.64  0.61 
Std. deviation  0.20  0.25  0.22 
Correlations in italics are not significant according to critical values of the 




Correlation coefficients among growth rates of GDP/POP 
1983-1996  France  EMU  EU 
France    0.89  0.88 
Ille de France  0.93  0.78  0.79 
Champagne-Ardenne  0.82  0.87  0.83 
Picardie  0.93  0.85  0.80 
Haute-Normandie  0.66  0.44  0.47 
Centre  0.96  0.82  0.82 
Basse-Normandie  0.77  0.75  0.72 
Bourgogne  0.93  0.78  0.78 
Nord - Pas-de-Calais  0.91  0.75  0.73 
Lorraine  0.91  0.84  0.84 
Alsace  0.82  0.70  0.68 
Franche-Comté  0.88  0.92  0.90 
Pays de la Loire  0.88  0.87  0.87 
Bretagne  0.90  0.69  0.70 
Poitou-Charentes  0.86  0.74  0.73 
Aquitaine  0.87  0.84  0.83 
Midi-Pyrénées  0.90  0.86  0.84 
Limousin  0.78  0.72  0.68 
Rhône-Alpes  0.96  0.84  0.83 
Auvergne  0.79  0.69  0.69 
Languedoc-Roussillon  0.78  0.70  0.65 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d`Azur  0.94  0.83  0.85 
Average  0.87  0.77  0.76 
Std. deviation  0.08  0.11  0.11 
      Correlations in italics are not significant according to critical values of the 
      Brandner and Neuser (1992) test. 
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Table 5 
Correlation coefficients among growth rates of GDP/POP 
1982-1996  Germany  EMU  EU  1982-1996  Germany  EMU  EU 
Germany    0.86  0.85  Braunschweig  0.69  0.59  0.53 
Stuttgart  0.72  0.61  0.55  Hannover  0.67  0.58  0.52 
Karlsruhe  0.70  0.59  0.52  Lüneburg  0.66  0.59  0.52 
Freiburg  0.70  0.60  0.53  Weser-Ems  0.66  0.58  0.51 
Tübingen  0.70  0.61  0.54  Düsseldorf  0.69  0.58  0.51 
Oberbayern  0.66  0.57  0.50  Köln  0.67  0.55  0.48 
Niederbayern  0.69  0.59  0.52  Münster  0.67  0.56  0.49 
Oberpfalz  0.69  0.59  0.52  Detmold  0.68  0.58  0.51 
Oberfranken  0.70  0.59  0.52  Arnsberg  0.69  0.59  0.52 
Mittelfranken  0.70  0.59  0.52  Koblenz  0.70  0.62  0.55 
Unterfranken  0.68  0.58  0.50  Trier  0.71  0.63  0.55 
Schwaben  0.69  0.58  0.51  Rheinhessen-Pfalz  0.71  0.62  0.56 
Bremen  0.64  0.55  0.48  Saarland  0.70  0.60  0.52 
Hamburg  0.67  0.55  0.47  Schleswig-Holstein  0.63  0.54  0.46 
Darmstadt  0.67  0.58  0.51  Average  0.69  0.60  0.53 
Gießen  0.65  0.56  0.49  Std. deviation  0.05  0.06  0.07 
Kassel  0.66  0.57  0.50         
    Correlations in italics are not significant according to critical values of the 
    Brandner and Neuser (1992) test. 
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Table 6 
Correlation coefficients among growth rates 
GDP/POP  WAGES/EMP  1982-1996 (GDP/POP) 
1981-1995 (W/EMP)  Italy  EMU  EU  Italy  EMU  EU 
Italy    0.85  0.86    0.92  0.95 
Piemonte  0.89  0.74  0.76  0.99  0.93  0.95 
Valle d`Aosta  0.91  0.75  0.77  0.93  0.86  0.89 
Liguria  0.91  0.74  0.72  0.99  0.91  0.95 
Lombardia  0.93  0.78  0.81  0.99  0.92  0.94 
Trentino-Alto Adige  0.86  0.79  0.79  0.98  0.88  0.93 
Veneto  0.92  0.77  0.79  0.99  0.92  0.95 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia  0.84  0.69  0.68  0.97  0.95  0.97 
Emilia-Romagna  0.88  0.72  0.73  1.00  0.92  0.94 
Toscana  0.90  0.67  0.68  0.99  0.91  0.94 
Umbria  0.91  0.80  0.80  0.99  0.89  0.93 
Marche  0.87  0.68  0.70  0.99  0.91  0.94 
Lazio  0.87  0.76  0.78  0.98  0.87  0.93 
Abruzzo  0.96  0.85  0.82  0.98  0.94  0.95 
Molise  0.86  0.66  0.70  0.94  0.91  0.93 
Campania  0.87  0.89  0.89  0.99  0.89  0.93 
Puglia  0.83  0.67  0.70  0.98  0.90  0.92 
Basilicata  0.44  0.45  0.43  0.94  0.85  0.89 
Calabria  0.39  0.12  0.14  0.94  0.89  0.90 
Sicilia  0.67  0.59  0.57  0.98  0.88  0.92 
Sardegna  0.77  0.67  0.66  0.98  0.91  0.93 
Average  0.82  0.70  0.70  0.98  0.90  0.93 
Std. deviation  0.15  0.16  0.16  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Correlations in italics are not significant according to critical values of the 
Brandner and Neuser (1992) test. 
 
Table 7 
Correlation coefficients among growth rates 
GDP/POP  WAGES/EMP  1982-1996 (GDP/POP) 
1981-1995 (W/EMP)  Netherlands  EMU  EU  Netherlands  EMU  EU 
Netherlands    0.74  0.70    0.51  0.44 
Groningen  0.49  0.05  0.02  0.97  0.57  0.50 
Friesland  0.61  0.49  0.46  0.79  0.44  0.35 
Drenthe  0.81  0.50  0.44  0.85  0.55  0.47 
Overijssel*  0.87  0.87  0.82  0.99  0.54  0.34 
Gelderland*  0.77  0.75  0.67  0.98  0.52  0.30 
Flevoland  0.23  0.53  0.49  0.77  0.27  0.11 
Utrecht  0.37  0.56  0.51  0.94  0.50  0.47 
Noord-Holland  0.94  0.68  0.66  0.95  0.65  0.59 
Zuid-Holland  0.68  0.78  0.74  0.99  0.50  0.44 
Zeeland  0.51  0.56  0.56  0.86  0.33  0.26 
Noord-Brabant  0.84  0.70  0.68  0.90  0.31  0.24 
Limburg  0.75  0.56  0.55  0.88  0.41  0.36 
Average  0.66  0.60  0.56  0.91  0.47  0.37 
Std. deviation  0.22  0.20  0.20  0.08  0.11  0.13 
  Correlations in italics are not significant according to critical values of the 
  Brandner and Neuser (1992) test. 
  * 1987-1996 (GDP/POP) and 1987-1995 (WAGES/EMP).  
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Table 8 
Correlation coefficients among growth rates of GDP/POP 
1982-1996  Portugal  EMU  EU 
Portugal    0.46  0.49 
Norte  0.39  0.22  0.22 
Centro (P)  0.36  0.17  0.19 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo  0.34  0.04  -0.01 
Alentejo  0.56  0.34  0.42 
Algarve  0.69  0.35  0.43 
Aores*  0.90  0.67  0.69 
Madeira*  0.80  0.32  0.29 
Average  0.58  0.32  0.34 
Std. deviation  0.21  0.18  0.20 
Correlations in italics are not significant according to critical 





Correlation coefficients among growth rates 
GDP/POP  WAGES/EMP  1982-1996 (GDP/POP) 
1981-1995 (W/EMP)  Spain  EMU  EU  Spain  EMU  EU 
Spain    0.71  0.76    0.91  0.88 
Galicia  0.67  0.43  0.46  0.87  0.78  0.76 
Asturias  0.72  0.46  0.51  0.97  0.89  0.87 
Cantabria  0.74  0.58  0.62  0.87  0.81  0.77 
Pais Vasco  0.78  0.51  0.54  0.94  0.85  0.80 
Navarra  0.67  0.39  0.42  0.95  0.86  0.82 
La Rioja  0.76  0.62  0.63  0.76  0.69  0.67 
Aragón  0.91  0.62  0.69  0.93  0.87  0.85 
Madrid  0.92  0.69  0.72  0.96  0.89  0.87 
Castilla y León  0.59  0.20  0.25  0.97  0.89  0.87 
Castilla-la Mancha  0.87  0.49  0.57  0.84  0.79  0.77 
Extremadura  0.49  0.30  0.34  0.84  0.81  0.80 
Cataluña  0.95  0.74  0.78  0.96  0.86  0.83 
Comunidad Valenciana  0.86  0.65  0.69  0.96  0.87  0.84 
Baleares  0.75  0.70  0.70  0.90  0.86  0.86 
Andalucia  0.94  0.66  0.69  0.89  0.80  0.77 
Murcia  0.71  0.62  0.65  0.88  0.73  0.72 
Canarias  0.77  0.56  0.66  0.88  0.84  0.82 
Average  0.77  0.55  0.59  0.90  0.83  0.81 
Std. deviation  0.13  0.15  0.15  0.06  0.06  0.06 
Correlations in italics are not significant correlations according to critical values of the 
Brandner and Neuser (1992) test. 
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Table 10 
Potential losers in terms of the macroeconomic cost of not having a national monetary 
policy*  Country 
EMU  EU 
Belgium  ------  Vlaams Brabant  Brabant Wallon 
France  Haute-Normandie  Haute-Normandie 
Karlsruhe  Gießen 
Oberbayern  Kassel 
Niederbayern  Hannover 
Oberpfalz  Lüneburg 
Oberfranken  Weser-Ems 
Mittelfranken  Düsseldorf 
Unterfranken  Köln 
Schwaben  Münster 
Bremen  Detmold 
Hamburg  Arnsberg 
Darmstadt  Saarland 
Germany  ------ 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Italy  ------  ------ 
Netherlands  Friesland  Drenthe  Friesland  Drenthe 
Alentejo  Aores  Alentejo  Aores  Portugal 
Algarve  Madeira  Algarve  Madeira 
Galicia  Navarra  Galicia  Navarra 
Asturias  Castilla y León  Asturias  Castilla y León  Spain 
Pais Vasco  Castilla-la Mancha  Pais Vasco  Castilla-la Mancha 
*Regions with a significant correlation with its countries but not with the EMU or with the EU. 
 
Table 11 
 Potential winners in terms of the 
macroeconomic cost of not having a 
national monetary policy*  Country 









Germany  ------  ------ 
Italy  Campania  Campania 
Flevoland**  Zuid-Holland 
Utrecht**  Zeeland** 
Zuid-Holland   
Netherlands 
Zeeland**   
Portugal  ------  ------ 
Spain  ------  ------ 
*Regions with a higher correlation with the EMU or with the 
EU despite of that correlation were significant or not with its 
Country. 
**Regions with no significant correlation with its country but  
significant with the EMU or EU. 